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The present book by Daniel Calis a quite thorough factual and
treatment of abortion,
at developing both a moral and
legal policy in this aiea. Thjs review
be concerned largely with the
._...... ;.,.,1 side of the book and the
1112estc~d moral and legal policy. Since
this paiL of the book the author
to insure as wide a hearing as
for himself, he believes that
must begin from a point on which
exists some consensus. He finds
in what he caUs the principle of
sanctity of life (understanding, of
, human life).

After four years of research and
reflection, Daniel Callahan has produced an important study of the
problem of abortion. Father John R.
Connery, S.J. reviews Callahan's book
(Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality,
MacMillan, 524 pages, $14.95 in this
issue. Father Connery is Professor of
Moral Theology at the Bellannine
School of 17teology, a division of Loy·
ola University, Chicago. A former
(1960-67) provincial of the Chicago
province of the Jesuit Order, Father
Connery has been a co"esponding
editor of AMERICA and has conducted the authoritative "Notes on Moral
Theology" section of THEOLOGICAL
STUDIES, besides contributing to
other theological journals and Jaw
reviews.

Book Review . . .
Callahan On Meaning Of Abort n*
John R. Connery, S.J.
Reprinted with permission from Na·
tiona/ Catholic Reporter, August 7.
1970.

THE LITERATURE on abortion is
becoming just about as abundant
today as the literature on contraception was a few years back. This
should probably not be surprising,
since the two problems are not
unrelated. In fact, some earlier theologians identified contraception as a
species of abortion, distinguishing
three different kinds of abortion
according to their degree of gravity:
The prevention of conception, the
expulsion of the fetus before anima-
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tion and the expulsion oJ ne fetus
after animation . With the rn • sophisticated knowledge of biolt ~al facts
available today I do not thit. that any
modern Uteologian woul classify
contraception as a species o tbortion,
but it is true that the same problems
that gave rise to the .,read of
contraception are being ..,resented
today to justify abortion. 11 is also
true that most abortions .,day are
performed as a primary or ,..-condar)'
method of birth control.
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This principle is accepted in Western
and most of Eastern) culture by both
and non-Christians, alfor different reasons. In
Mil~<:w;sintl!. the principle he tells us that
the Catholic and Protestant
it is founded on the truth
God is the Lord of Life and
1 do not think that anyone
doubt that this truth is quite
lb ertinertt to the whole question , but I
that more must be said before it
offer any special protection to
. ...uuu,u life. God is after all the Lord of
creation, but this does not prevent
from taking vegetable or animal
. Why should it prevent man from
human life? It is not precisely,
at least not solely, God's dominion
protects human life, but the fact
man is the crown of creation. The
of creation fulfills its purpose in
service of man, a service that may
call for destruction. But there is
higher form of creation to which
is subordinated. It is because of
privileged position of human life
it must be respected, and any
·
of man would be
IIIII:Onsis1tent with this position. There
no reason to believe, therefore, that

man shares any general dominion over
human life. as he does over the other
forms of life on earth.

Callahan admi ts that the principle
of the sanctity of life, however
acceptable and valuable , is somewhat
vague as it stands. If it is to be useful ,
it must be translated into rules. He
divides the rules stemming from the
principle into five different categories,
covering respectively: the protection
of species life; the protection of family
lineage life ; the protection of personlife ; the protection of bodily life; and
the protection of physical integrity.
What becomes very important , of
course, is the relationship between
these different rule systems, and of
particular concern is the problem of
conflict. What is one to do when one
rule conflicts with another?

Some have tried to solve this
problem by establishing a hierarchcal order among the rules. Callahan
himself is not very entlmsiastic about
such a grading, since he feels that no
fixed ordering of rules could be
worked out for all times, e.g., in times
of overpopulation rules governing
species life might take precedence over
rules governing individual life. Or, to
put the problem more pertinently, a
situation of overpopulation might call
for an abortion decision.

In discussing this problem Callahan
makes an observation which I think is
key to his whole approach. The basis
for his resolution of conflict between
rule systems is not so much a
comparative evaluation of the rules
themselves as it is their relation to the
principle of the sanctity of life. He
observes that the principle implies
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wther than entails the various rules it
giVes rise to. The meaning of this
distinction is not too obvious from the
words themselves, but what Callahan
wants to communicate, I believe , is
that no categoricaJ rule fl ows from this
principle . No rule is ironclad, therefore, and as a result any one can give
way to another. This is true even of
the right to individual life.
What the principle does is establish
a strong bias in favor of rules
protecting life. It certainly implies a
rule about the right to individual life,
but calls for no more than a bias in
favor of such a rule. Similarly, it
would seem to call for a bias in favor
of rules protecting person-life, species-life, etc. But if one is to be biased
in the direction of all these rule
systems, a question arises as to how to
solve conmcts between them.

CaJlahan is opposed to a o
moral
code that makes the proh• ln of
abortion absolute. He feels t1 n this
approach no room is left fo r
other
demands of the principle f the
sanctity o f life. He is thus OJ
ed to
the traditional Roman Cath
position on abortion , which
calls
one-dimensional in contrast I
s own
pluri-dimensional approach
1 this
one-dimensional approach, a ! tells
us, the welfare of the fetus
~ s fuiJ
precedence , allowing little n · than
sympathy for the mother, a
pathy
which cannot be translal
into
action, e.g., by an indu ced
•rtion,
uuder any circumstances.

to this same degree of
least for the life of the

AN IMPORTANT quesUon conwith the abortion issue conthe beginning of human life.
finds three different schools
thought on this subject. The genetic
dates the beginning of human
from the time of conception , since
whole genetic package is present in
original conceptus; the rest is
a process of development. A
~~~~o..;~••"'n position would date human
fro m the time of the "primitive
. ..... ___ , _ , or the moment af ter twinning
occur, or from the moment of
tation.

1 suspect that Callahan ha better
understanding of the Cathth stance
than the above statement w ld lead
"developmental"
school
one to believe. At least I t 1k this
a certain degree of developstatement is open to seriom !Sinterbefore aJiowing one to speak of
pretation. The Catholic posit
is not
individual
human being. Within this
one-dimensional in the sen~ hat it
there are differences of opinMY IMPRESSION is that Callahan gives precedence to the welL of the
and these cover a wide range,
is presenting here a situational or
child. It does not give p ·dence
the amount of development
contextual approach to moral pro- either to the welfare of th~ tild or
One author, distinguishing
blems. While admitting a right to life the welfare of the mother
other
human life and a human
and a rule against taking physical life, times (and perhaps even nov 1 same
, caJJs for the existence of a
he will not give these any absolute parts of the world) when a
sarean
human brain before speaking of a
priority, but feels that they must be section was tantamount 1 lethal
person; others would demand
balanced against other rule systems surgery , it was the wei fan of the
more than t his. This school
implied by the sanctity of life. This is mother that took preceden
(Paul
include, of course, those who
obviously not an antinomian, or even a Comitolus, S.J., an early 171 ,·eotury
hold
the old scholastic opinion
nominalistic, type of situationism, but
moralist , calls those doct or~ no say ·
delayed animation.
resolves conflicts between rules by an that it is permissable to dn secUon
appeal to situa tions or circumstances. on a mother to save the h of the
The traditional Catholic position has child (or provide for its tpUsm)
The third school puts the stress on
been that there are no real conflicts "butchers," and charges th, rtl with
l
~
social consequences. According to
between rules, since it is impossible for killing an innocent person .)
'JIIis
school the decision to call a
a person to be obliged to do and not
a human being is not a
to do something at the same time . It
of
genetics
or morphology but
The
Catholic
position
is
on
·-difnenwould also maintain that there are
entirely
on
the social consesionaJ
(if
one
wishes
to
use
th•
kind
of
limits to what one can do to solve such
IBIIIIIlLces
of
such
a
decision.
terminology)
in
the
sense
that
.it
problems as overpopulation, and that
if one goes beyong these limits he wiU opposes without compromiM. the _kil·
create a more serious problem than he ling of either the mother or 1 oe chilJd. I!IIIWllUJ has, and should have, serious
A pluri-dimensional approa.. 1 is not
solves.
l llllll~·tions to this school (at least as he

282

Linacre o uartedY

understands 1l), since it ignores both
biological date and the existence of
genuine potentialities in the human
fetus. Also, if one can define prenatal
human life ·any way he wishes
according to social consequences, why
cannot he do the same for postnatal
life? If the social consequences called
for it , it would seem that one could
define human life in such a way as to
allow for infanticide.
Callahan himself opts for the
position of the developmental school.
His ultimate reason for doing so is
that this school is sufficiently sensitive
to the biological date to ascribe human
life even to the zygote, but at the same
time open to a wide range of values
that would allow for a choice between
the zygote or fetus up to a certajn
stage of development and other
life-vaJues.
What is not clear in Callahan's
position is just where he would draw
the line when there is question of
taking human life. He speaks of even a
very late abortion in a case wher!
opposing life values are very important. This would seem to imply (since
he uses the term abortion) that he
would draw the line at least at
viability. Yet in another section of the
book he speaks (and with seeming
approval) even of a craniotomy to save
the life of the mother, a problem that
would not arise until delivery time. My
impression is that he would want to
draw the line at least at birth , but even
there I am not sure why he would or
how he could. If the principle of the
sanctity of life involves respect for life
in all its forms, but does not entail any
absolute prohibitions, how does one
resolve conflicts between rules after
birth? Or are we to assume that such
confUcts will not arise after birth?
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We have already mentioned that
Callahan is opposed to the traditional
Catholic position. He devotes at this
point an entire chapter to an analysis
and a criticism of this position. The
first part of the chapter offers a brief
summary of Roman Catholic teaching
on abortion, but by his own admission
he is largely dependent on others. and
particuJarly on John T. Noonan, in
this summary. In reading the summary
there are times when one would like a
more careful statement or interpretation of the Catholic position, but it
does serve to date the uncompromising
attitude toward abortion from Apostolic times.

There is one statement made by
Callahan toward the end of the
summary that does calJ for comment.
Following Noonan, he states that there
are two exceptions to the Catholic
stand on abortion: abort ion in the case
of a cancerous uterus and in the case
of ectopic pregancy. I do not think
any Catholic theologian would speak
in these terms. Current Catholic
teaching does not allow any exceptions in the area of direct abortion.
The two scxalled exceptions are cases
of indirect abort ion, and there is no
reason to limit the number to two. I
do not doubt that Callahan understands the theology here , but the
terminology is somewhat misleading.
We are not dealing here with a type of
casuistry but with a distinction based
on a principle. The question is not
when is abortion right and when is it
wrong, but rather what is an act of
abortion and what is not. It is the
Catholic position that o ne is not
responsible for an abortion that is
incidental to an act with is otherwise
good, if the good results are at least of
equal value .
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IN BRJEFl NG tbe Cathols1
Callahan tells us that it can b~o
up in four principles: I)Gou
the Lord of life. 2) Human
not have the right to take oth•
beings. 3) Human life begJJ
moment of concept ion. 4)
at whatever stage of develo1
the conceptus. is the taking •
life. Some attention has air.
given to the first principle sel
Callahan, but the other thrc
for some comment. First
caution is in order" regar
second principle; that bum
do not have the right to tak•
of other innocent human b,
principle is correct as it star1
would be a mistake to r~·
whole matter merely to th~
of the rights of others. It is
man even to take his ow'
obligation which has notht
with communtative justice
forbidden is direct killing eiu
or of other innocent hum.•
and the basis for this, a
pointed out , is the privilege'
of human life.

sition
1uned
1nc is
gs do
uman
II the
rtion,
:nl of
uman
been
wn by
,o call
all, a
g the
beings
e lives

on the principle that
begins at the moment of

traditional argument used
the abortion of the unfotmed
was twofold . Some authors
d it homicidium anticipatum,
quo ting Tertullian in this regard
est qui futurus est" - He is a
who will be a man). Others used
a fortiori argument based on the
of contraception. If it was wrong
abort semen simplex, it was even
wrong to abort semen conwhich was closer to life. No
~- The
drawn from the presence
but it
the soul from the moment of
e lll.is •• !M'IrPntion was used. ActuaiJy , the
eslion
has never made a statement
.ng for
the time of animation with
fe, an
moment of conception. The most
to do
can find is the condemnation of
.'hat is
t XI (1 679) of the opinion
of self
the fetus is not animated until it
heings,
born. This, of course, is a long way
!ready
teaching that animation takes
.1sition
at the moment of conception.

I think I would have to
e issue
with the sta tement that tlh ,,pinion
that human life begins at th noment ·
of conception is of the sub wee of
the Ca tholic position. It sl ,uJd be
clear from the history pre 1ted by
Callahan that the theory or delayed
animation dominated Catlw l•l thinking about abortion for ma ny oturies.
In fa ct the distinction bel •een the
formed ' and unformed fet u has its
origin in the Septuagint ' ··rsion of
Exodus (21, 22-25). Yet all ,t bortion
was condemned right dowu from
Apostolic times. It is di ffk ul t to see
then how the Catholic posil tNt can be
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To say, then, as stated in the fourth
•• :mcrtple, that according to tJ1e Cathoposition abortion, at whatever stage
development of the conceptus, is
taking of innocent human life,
reflect the present thought of
Catholic theologians, but it does
represent accurately traditional
n_ I suppose most Catholic
today no longer think in
of delayed animation, but it
not be forgotten that the
...,,,,nr•<> l absolute condemnation of
coexisted for many centuries
this theory. One may wish to
issue with the Catholic position,
Callahan does, but one should do so
a clear understanding.

Callahan also criticizes Catholic ·
moral theology because it countenances the death of both the fetus and
the mother rather than directly take
the life of the fetus. He is speaking
here of a case where a craniotomy
would save the life of the mother. He
admits that this would be a rare case
(in fact , practically unheard of today),
but what he objects to is the principle.
CertainJy, this is a very difficult
application of the principle involved,
and one might well not want to
disturb the good faith of a mother or
doctor in a case of this kind; but the
position that would allow the taking
of one life rather than Jet two people
die seems to come close to a kind of
act-utilitarianism. The dilemma involved here reminds one of the case
with which one author chaiJanged the
extreme utilitarians. It is the case of a
sheriff in the South faced with the
choice either of framing a Negro
suspected of rape (but whom he knew
to be innocent) and tJ1Us preventing
serious anti-Negro riots which would
lead to the loss of several lives .. .. or
of hunting for the guilty party,
thereby aiJowing the riots to take
place and the subsequent loss of life
(including in all probability the Negro
suspect). An act-utilitarian would seem
committed to framing the Negro and
executing him.

l do not know how Callahan would
handle a case like tills, but it is not
without some likeness to the craniotomy case. At least l am afra id that it
is a little simplistic to say that "a
theology that would countenance the
death of both fetus and mother rather
than directly take the life of the fetus
is one geared to a preoccupation with
preserving individuals from sin or
crime."
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Callahan takes a stand not only
ag;.~inst the Catholic position but also
against the position that opts for
abortion on request. The basis for this
position is that a woman has a right
not to have children and that this right
is not prejudiced by the fact that she is
pregnant. Callahan ftnds this position
as one-dimensional as the Catholic
position. Whereas the Catholic position makes the rights of the fetus
decisive, this one makes the rights of
the woman decisive, and considers no
other values. But he makes clear that
he is criticizing this position only as a
moral stance. Later he will maintain
that allowing women abortion on
request represents good public and
legal pol icy, but here he arg1.1es very
effectively against the supremacy of
women's rights in abortion decisions.
CALLAHAN CONCLUDES hls
treatment of abortion with a consideration of what the legal and moral
policy should be in this area. As the
result of his very thorough study of
laws on abortion all over the world, he
concludes that the most permissive
laws, allowing abortion practically on
request, are the best ones, although he
would not want abortion completely
unregulated by law. He is opposed to
restrictive legislation because . among
other reasons, it is unenforceable,
discriminatory and leads to a Large
number of illegal abortions. He is in
favor of permissive laws because the
death and injury rate from induced
abortions is very low in countries
which have such laws. He also thinks
that such laws put the abortion
decision in the hands of the woman
where it should be. He would not be
opposed to limiting the free dom of the
woman where the common good calls
for it, but he does not think that
permissive laws of this kind are a
threat to the common good.
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I suppose it should be sa1 11tially
Jn can
that the Catholic moral theu
live with legalized abortion 1 can be
.er evil
shown that it is at least a
Mter aU , they lived with ~ali zed
prositution for centuries and era ted
tainly,
it to prevent greater evils.
there is a difference betwce1 ~alized
prostitution and legalized al 10n. In
;essary
prostitution there is no
others.
involvement of the right s •
But abortion involves the r i~ of the
JCtions
fetus, and one of the main
of civil law is to protect hu n rights,
especially the rights of tl • who
would
cannot defend themselves. (
,
more
have liked to find in Calk
~
chief
discussion of lhis problem
concern in the discussion ' legal
poHcy seemed to be with tl1 ~hts of
the woman.
lt should be mentioned.
and J believe to his credit ,
opposed to removing all
from abortion, although CVl
seems more concerned with
of the woman. He believe ~
completely unregulated si h
would be under all kinds o
to undergo abortion and
enjoy a real freedom in tho

•wever,
t he is
ulation
1cre he
· rights
Jt in a
on she
essures
ld not
•cision.

To be honest , I would ha'
• adroit
that J was not greatly impre!by the
strength of the case Callaha1 s made'
for permissive laws. He him~· admits
that although there would · reduc·
tion in the number of illegal 1-)ortions
there would be a rise in •c total
number, and particularly a 1 I! in the
number of young, unmarrie• women,
and married women wit h no hitdren,
seeking abortion. He also 1cknoW·
ledges Utat, for many, abort1 .n would
become a primary method , contra·
ception, for others a .:conda~
method. Finally, he agrees th 1 a hab1l
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abortion might develop more
underdeveloped countries.
opuuon these are very
evils, and I am not sure
they are offset by the advantages
Callahan maintains derive from
laws, even presuming that these
above challenge. Callahan would
that the above evils could be
by an extensive educational
although he admits that
this direction have not
thus far. Also, even if he
made a strong case for permissive
I should think that the legal
of a country would have to vary
to the local situation . I
ftnd it hard to believe, for
, that highly permissive laws
be best for a country like

HIS FINAL consideration Caltakes up the moral decision
abortion. As previously
111"'"uc::u. he does not advocate the
freedom on the moral level he
like to see in legal policy. He
the fact that many women in
an abortion decision will tum
their own religious tradition.
I would assume from his
of the subject that he would
be enthusiastic about turning to
Roman Catholic tradition. For
who have no tradition to turn
he makes suggestions toward what
calls an ethic of personal responsi. Such an ethic wiU not provide
ready-made decisions but will have
take into account most of the
considred in the book. A person

making an abortion decision will have
to face two issues: the beginning of
human life and the sanctity of human
life. In dealing with the first problem
Callahan would recommend the approach of the developmental school,
although it is his thinking that
abortion even in the earliest stages
presents a moral problem. Genetic
evidence prevents one from considering even a very early conceptus as a
mere piece of tissue. A respect for the
sanctity of life should bias a woman
against abortion even in the very early
stages, but her other duties toward life
could overcome this bias and constitute sufficient reason for taking the
life of even a very late fetus. In these
cases abortion itself would be serving
the principle of the sanctity of life.
Since l have already expressed serious
misgivings about this approach, I do
not think there is need for further
comment here.

Although l have taken issue with
the author on many things and wouJd
have to disagree with• his moral
approach to the problem of abortion, 1
would not be speaking the whole truth
if 1 did not say that I have great
respect for the work he has done. It is
the most comprehensive treatment of
this difficult problem yet published
and gives clear evidence of much
careful research. There is also a
commendable honesty and integrity
about the book which promotes
confidence. 1 think the author faced
all the pertinent issues and faced them
courageously. The bookls written well
and in a very easy style that makes for
enjoyable reading.
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